Economic literature provides mixed results about what really matters at corporate governance and the board room. Some research covering different countries suggests that size and ratio of board room matters. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the performance impact at the board level in the corporate governance of Japanese companies. We investigate the size as well as the ratio of outside directors and outside auditors and apply them to all Japanese manufacturing companies listing on the First Stock Exchange in Tokyo, a set of 821 companies.
Introduction
The boards of large organization play an important role in the corporate governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . It plays a key role in monitoring and controlling managers and can be described as a bridge between company management and shareholders (Dalton et al., 1999) . Previous, the Japanese bank-based system is often times closely linked to the German system (Sakakibara, 1995; Dore, 1996 Dore, , 2000 Yamamura and Streeck, 2003) .
Historically, both countries have been bank-dominated by strong stakeholder-orientation (Jackson and Moerke, 2005) . However, in contrast to German system of co-determination, Japanese law does not require employee participation at the board level. Japanese boards traditionally have been comprised almost exclusively of managers who served their whole career in the same company (Milhaupt and West, 2004) . In recent years, there are indicators that this system changed in Japan already after the bubble economy in the beginning of the 90 th .
Despite past economic success, Japanese companies faced strong pressure to change their corporate governance system. Japan's legal framework of corporate ownership changed (Egashira, 2001; Kanda, 2001; Wakasugi, 2004 , Seki, 2005 . The changes covered corporate law and other regulations as well as the role of the banks and the whole financial system (Jackson and Moerke, 2005) . A new stock-swap system and a stock option plan was introduced. Furthermore, companies have to apply new market accounting standards (Bebenroth, 2003) . Since April 2002 even US-style corporate governance system is possible for Japanese companies to choose. This was possible because of an amendment of the Commercial Code. Besides these legal changes, several attempts were made to introduce a corporate governance code. In 2001 a Japanese corporate governance code was published and in 2004 the "new principles of a corporate governance for stock listed companies" were released (Internet www.ecgi.org/codes).
However, Japanese companies do not have to use British style of comply or explain in case they do not comply with the rules.
This paper is one of several contemporaneous papers, studying performance impact at the board level in the corporate governance of Japanese companies as a country in depth study. We investigate on the one hand board size as a performance impact, on the other hand the outside ratio of directors and auditors to the performance. The structure of this paper is the following. In chapter 2 we discuss ownership concentration versus board size performance impact of corporate governance. A segmentation of Japanese companies as a very new approach will be done in chapter 3. At chapter 4 we bring our research model, chapter 5 is about data and variables and in chapter 6 we present our analysis. Chapter 7 highlights discussion and in chapter 8 we close our research with a conclusion.
Ownership concentration versus board size
In the literature there is substantial evidence that a variation in country level rules, like the corporate governance system influences the capital market strength. A line of country comparison research by La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer and Vishney provides evidence that corporate governance does matter. This evidence is based on several cross country studies (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 , 1999 , 2000 . Countries with stronger legal protection of minority shareholders have larger security markets, higher value for minority shareholder and less concentrated share ownership. -de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) find out that changes in the legal protection of minority shareholders can affect the value of control rights.
Lopez
On the one hand, there are studies investigating about ownership concentration. On the other hand, some studies investigate about characteristics of the board room in regard to the corporate governance.
Many studies in the field of ownership concentration emphasize on agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) in relation to social context where ownership concentration has been used to measure ties to the investors (Gerlach, 1992) . Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) researched about ownership structure and firm profitability of Japanese companies. They found a positive relationship between ownership concentration and financial performance. Ownership was measured by three categories, the largest five blockholders, nonfinancial companies (Keiretsu) and financial companies. In all three cases they found correlation for performance. In the first case looking at five biggest shareholder, correlation was significant positive.
When keireitsu or banks were concentrated owner, correlation was negative.
However, data of their study was taken from 1986-1991. Especially this time period is difficult to analyse as it was at the end of the Japanese bubble economy. There is much more limited evidence at a single country level that variations of corporate governance practices lead to a performance impact. toward the separation between the members of the board and the executive officers at the board. These directors are responsible for divisional operation.
They receive the new title of "shikko-yakuin." Sony was one of the first companies who introduced an executive officer system with shikko-yakuin to separate monitoring board from operational functional board (Seki, 2005) .
Soon after, Sony, turned in to US-style system with nomination committees. 
Research Model
This study deals about board room in Japanese companies and is very new in its kind. We divide Japanese companies into three blocks. First are companies who maintain with the traditional Japanese style board system without any outside directors. Second group contains Japanese companies who introduced outside directors but remained to the auditor system. Third group exists of Japanese companies who completely changed their board to US-style system which introduced outside directors but no conventional auditor system. In this system a three committee is set up (in Japanese:
Iinkai to sechi geisha). In this regard, we investigate about board size and ratio of outside directors /auditors in comparison to the performance. We measure performance with latest financial data by Tobin's Q for the year
2004.

Hypothesis
Board size
A bulk of literature determines the Board size as an important factor of effective corporate governance (Jensen, 1993; Dalten et al., 1999; Bonn et al., 2004) . There is a clear sign that smaller board size is preferable to have better performance.
Only minor studies find a positive correlation between board size and firm value (Ferris et al., 2003) . According to resource dependence theory, larger boards have higher level of performance as they have better ability of securing critical resources. Furthermore, large boards may be able to create links to other institutions more easily than smaller boards (Pfeffer, 1972; Goodstein et al., 1994) . and US-style system even more timly we suggest that traditional Japanese companies have bigger board sizes. Therefore, our first hypotheses is:
1.a) Traditional Japanese board system companies have the biggest board size, JUS are in the middle and US-style boards have the smallest number of directors.
Ratio of outside directors and outside auditors
Naturally, the board of directors is composed not only of inside but also of outside directors. By amendment of the Commercial Code in 2002 the first definition of an "outside director" was established. An outside director is defined as a person who has not been director, officer or employee of the same company or its subsidiaries. Furthermore, this person does not executive the business of the company. However, neither a clear requirement nor independence of an outside director is clearly specified (Seki, 2005) .
There is already some research done about board composition including outside directors (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Bonn et al., 2004) .
Japan is clearly considered to have insider dominated boards (Charkham, 1994) . Studies have shown only to a small extend mixed results in what proportion is best for monitoring a company most effective (Baysinger et al., 1991; Chaganti et al., 1985) . Some first studies in this field support the hypothesis that inside directors are less effective than boards with more outside directors. Some researcher suggest; therefore, that an increase of outside directors makes the board become more effective in managerial performance (Fama, 1980; Bonn et al. 2004) . We want to test this hypothesis for our sample for outside directors and outside auditors. In 2004, exactly 523 companies from TSE First Section (35% of all listed companies) appointed at least one outside director (Seki, 2005) . As traditional companies do not have any outside directors, this argument is to apply to two different Japanese boards, to the US-style board companies as well as to JUS system companies with outside directors. We suppose that US style system companies have a higher ratio of outside directors as they have majority of outside directors in their committees. Our hypothesis therefore is:
1.b) US-style boards have higher outside director ratio than JUS style Japanese companies.
As a next step regression analysis will be accomplished. Performance will be measured by Tobin's Q for fiscal year 2004. For this we measure the performance of our companies whom we divided into three groups.
With a regression analysis we measure performance to outside director ratio:
2.a) Small board size leads to higher performance.
In the next regression analysis, we measure ratio of outside director / auditor 2.b) High outside director /auditor ratio leads to higher performance.
In the final ANOVA analysis we measure performance to our three groups:
3.) Traditional Japanese board system companies have the weakest performance, JUS are in the middle and US-style board companies have the highest performance.
Data and Variables
For this study, several sources of data were necessary. Financial Data were collected from NEEDs-databank, an electronic version. Data about board structure were collected from printed version of Yakuin Shikoho (Board of Director Handbook).
Our sample consists of 821 companies. All of these companies are from manufacturing sector to eliminate industry-level fixed effects. The sample consists of Japanese First Stock Exchange listed companies, where we found 834. For 13 companies we could not find data so that we filtered our sample finally to 821 companies for the fiscal year 2003 and 2004.
Board structure variables as independent variables
We use board structure as independent variables. Board structure includes the numbers of inside and outside directors /auditors, we come up also with the ratio of both groups. In our study we focus on the board size as well as the ratio of outside directors /outside auditors. Outside directors are defined as such directors who are not former employees of the firm. The ratio of outside directors /auditors was measured as outsiders to the total number of directors /auditors. We place a dummy variable for the traditional Japanese board system (without any outside director /auditor), for JUS-style companies (who appointed at least one outside director) and for US-style adopted companies.
Dependent variables and control variables
There are many ways of measuring the performance of companies. Better governed companies could be more profitable, or they could pay higher dividends for a given level of profits, or investors could just value same dividends (or earnings) to a higher level. Many other studies connected to
Japan and related to performance use ROA (Prowse, 1992; Nitta 2000; Suzuki and Sho, 2000; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003 As control variable we use five variables. LN(Total Assets), LN (Turnover), fixed asset ratio, growth rate of return (for the last 5 years) and growth rate of cash flow (also for the last 5 years).
For controlling the firm size, we follow the common practice of using LN (assets) as Durnev and Kim (2003) . In line with prior research the coefficient on LN (assets) should be negative. These variables can be in contrast to each other. For example, some companies might focus on high turnover, others might focus on growth rate of return or on a high market share. All the financial data was retrieved from NEEDS Databank.
Analysis
We did 3 Types of Analyses. First, we accomplished a descriptive analysis.
After that several correlation analyses were done. Finally, third, regression and ANOVA analyses were necessary to investigate about statistical significance of our variables. There is a strong correlation between the ratio of outside directors and Tobin's Q for both years with 1% significance. The ratio of outside auditors to Tobin's Q is significant for two years on 1% and 10% level. 
Discussion
First, it is for us a surprise that the board member size in our study is much lower than described in almost all other previous studies about Japanese This study has also some shortcomings. We measured the performance only by Tobin's Q and only for the year 2004. It would be interesting to see if the results will be robust using other measure for performance or other years.
Conclusion
The 
